may not be possible to achieve, as virus replicates in the upper respiratory tract even in the presence of specific antibodies, similarly to other respiratory viruses. Because dromedary camels do not show severe clinical signs upon MERS-CoV infection, vaccination of dromedaries should primarily aim to reduce virus excretion to prevent virus spreading. Young dromedaries excrete more infectious MERS-CoV than adults (8, 15, 16), so young animals should be vaccinated first. Our results reveal that MVA-S vaccination of young dromedary camels may significantly reduce infectious MERS-CoV excreted from the nose. Two major advantages of the orthopoxvirus-based vector used in our study include its capacity to induce protective immunity in the presence of preexisting (e.g., maternal) antibodies (32) and the observation that MVA-specific antibodies cross-neutralize camelpox virus, revealing the potential dual use of this candidate MERS-CoV vaccine in dromedaries. Dromedary camels vaccinated with conventional vaccinia virus showed no clinical signs upon challenge with camelpox virus, whereas control animals developed typical symptoms of generalized camelpox (33). The MVA-S vectored vaccine may also be tested for protection of humans at risk, such as health care workers and people in regular contact with camels.
We thank F. van der Panne for figure preparation and P. van Run, S. Jany, X. Abad, I. Cordón, M. Jesús Navas, M. Mora, and all animal caretakers from the CReSA biosecurity level 3 laboratories and animal facilities for technical assistance. (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) , the prevalence and evolution of the MERS-CoV in this animal and the route of virus transmission to humans are not well defined, and little is known of other CoV species that may circulate in camels and how they might influence CoV ecology.
We conducted surveillance for CoVs in dromedary camels in Saudi Arabia, the country most affected by MERS, from May 2014 to April 2015. Initially, paired nasal and rectal swabs were collected from camels at slaughterhouses, farms, and wholesale markets in Jeddah and Riyadh. Because rectal swabs were negative for MERS-CoVs (tables S1 and S2), only nasal swabs were subsequently collected at these sites and in Taif (15) . Of the 1309 camels tested, 25.3% were positive for CoV, came from wholesale markets (tables S1 and S2), where indigenous camels mixed with camels imported from Sudan and Somalia. Local camels had significantly higher positive rates for MERSCoVs and other CoVs than did imported camels (Pearson's c 2 test, P < 0.05; tables S1 and S2).
Three CoV species were detected in dromedary camels: MERS-CoV (betacoronavirus, group C); betacoronavirus 1 (betacoronavirus, group A); and human CoV 229E (alphacoronavirus) ( fig. S1 ). Viruses from the latter two species are designated as camel b1-HKU23-CoVs and camelid a-CoVs, respectively. Although CoVs were detected almost year-round in these animals, a relatively higher prevalence of both MERS-CoV and camelid a-CoV was observed from December 2014 to April 2015 (tables S1 and S2). Juvenile camels (0.5 to 1 year old) had the highest levels of respiratory
sciencemag.org SCIENCE infections with both the MERS-CoV and camelid a-CoV, followed by calves under 6 months, both at about twice the rate observed in camels aged 1 to 2 years (table S2) . Younger camels seem to play a more important epidemiological role in maintaining both viruses, which is consistent with previous findings (10, 11, 16, 17) .
The overall positive rates for MERS-CoV and camelid a-CoV from nasal swabs were 12.1 and 19.8%, respectively (tables S1 and S2). However, only 3 of 304 camel rectal swabs were CoV-positive for either camelid a-or camel b1-HKU23-CoVs (tables S1 and S2). Thus, a major mode of virus shedding of the MERS-and camelid a-CoVs is from the respiratory tract of dromedary camels. Over half of MERS-CoV-positive nasal swabs (56.6%) were also positive for camelid a-CoVs, indicating frequent co-infections of these viruses (tables S1 and S2). Nasal swabs from two animals contained all three species of CoVs detected in our survey. The high prevalence of these viruses suggests that they are enzootic in dromedary camels.
To examine the genetic diversity and evolution of the camel CoVs, metagenomic sequencing was carried out using the original swab materials that were positive in the initial RT-PCR screening. A total of 93 full-length viral genomes (67 MERSCoVs, 25 camelid a-CoVs, and one camel b1-HKU23-CoV) were obtained from 79 nasal swab samples. Thirty-eight of these samples presented co-infections of MERS-CoV with one or both of the two other CoV species, but only 14 samples yielded two complete genomes.
b1-HKU23-CoVs have been detected in camels in Dubai (18) , and the camelid a-CoVs are closely related to a virus isolated from alpacas in California in 2007 ( fig. S1) (19, 20) . The camelid a-CoVs clustered with the human CoV 229E ( fig.  S1 ), a causal agent of common colds in humans. The high prevalence of asymptomatic infections with camelid a-CoVs in Saudi Arabian camels emphasizes the important role that this species plays in CoV ecology.
Recombination has been reported in the MERSCoV species (21, 22) . Phylogenetic analysis of the MERS-CoV full-genome sequences obtained in this study (n = 67), together with those available in public databases (n = 106), revealed recombination signatures that defined five major phylogenetically stable lineages, all of which contained human and camel MERS-CoV sequences ( Fig. 1 and  figs. S2 and S3) . A few viruses that showed inconsistent topologies in subgenomic trees, suggesting that they have a more varied history of recombination, were not classified within the five main lineages (fig. S2 ). MERS-CoVs from Saudi Arabian camels were found within each of the five lineages; the viruses sequenced in this study fell into lineages 3, 4, and 5, with the exception of some minor recombinants (Figs. 1 and 2 and figs. S2 and S3). Thus, the evolution of MERS-CoVs within camels has led to diverse lineages that have all caused human infections, indicating that there is a low barrier for interspecies transmission.
MERS-CoVs obtained between July and December 2014 mainly fell into lineages 3 and 5, whereas those from 2015 were principally from lineage 5 ( Fig. 2 and figs. S2 and S3 ). Four viruses sampled during December 2014, which showed evidence of a small recombinant region, and a virus from March 2015 belonged to lineage 4 ( Fig. 2 and figs. S2 to  S4 ). Viruses from lineage 5, which are associated with the Korean outbreak and the recent human infections in Riyadh (Fig. 1) (3 (Fig. 1) . The phylogeny indicates that lineage 5 viruses evolved from a recombinant virus that acquired the 5' part of ORF1ab and the 3' part of the S (spike) gene from lineage 4 and the remaining genomic regions from lineage 3 (Fig. 1C) . In both subgenomic phylogenies, lineage 5 viruses were closely related to lineage 3 and 4 viruses from Saudi Arabian camels, suggesting that they hosted this recombination event. Ten synonymous nucleotide changes and a Thr6381Ala amino acid substitution in the nsp14-exonuclease of the ORF1ab polyprotein, relative to lineage 3, were due to the recombination in lineage 5 (Fig. 1A) . The possible function of these substitutions requires further investigation. A molecular clock dating analysis indicates that the recombination event probably occurred between December 2013 and June 2014 ( fig. S5 ). Nine other putative MERSCoV recombinant strains ( fig. S4) were seemingly generated by sporadic events and have not persisted in the population, or may represent mixed infections of MERS-CoV strains from different lineages. Although frequent co-infections of MERSand camelid a-CoVs were observed (tables S1 and S2), no evidence of recombination among them was identified.
Four CoV species circulate widely in humans, and two others have caused severe sporadic infections with limited human-to-human transmission (1, 25) . The wide species range of CoVs and their propensity to cross species boundaries suggest that more will emerge in the future. Since the first report of MERS in 2012 (1, 2), the causative virus has been transmitted to over 25 countries, mostly by international travelers that have been to the Middle East (3). Even though a high prevalence of MERS-CoVs has been detected in this work and in previous studies of dromedary camels (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) , limited quarantine and biosecurity measures are in place to reduce the exposure of humans to the virus, and more cases must be expected in the future. The recent outbreak of MERS in Korea (3) shows that MERS-CoVs have the ability to cause large outbreaks in environments that are different from Middle East. Although changes in human population density, climate conditions, and social factors may contribute to the spread of MERS-CoVs in other regions, the prevention of transmission at the animal/human interface is likely to be the most efficient measure to contain the threat from this virus.
